While mere entry into a car is not enough to support a conviction for Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle (UUV), entry and subsequent vandalism of the car's interior is sufficient. In People v. Franov (Ct. App. 5/10/2011) (Graffeo, J.) (4-1-2), the defendant broke into a car, vandalized the interior, and left with a part that he had taken from inside the vehicle. At issue was whether the evidence was legally sufficient to convict him of UUV. The majority concluded that it was.
The majority relied principally on legislative history. The prior version of the UUV statute criminalized only joyriding or attempted joyriding (i.e., actual operation). The amended version states, however, that a person is guilty if "[k]nowing that he does not have the consent of the owner, he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle." In subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals affirmed that the statute had been broadened. It upheld convictions for defendants sitting in a parked car, one with the key in the ignition and the other with the engine running. In a third case, the defendant was sitting in the passenger seat of his car while his companion was trying to start the car; the defendant's conviction was upheld.
The majority held that operability is not the "sine qua non" of the statute. Thus, that the defendant did not have a key was not relevant. "On the other hand, entry alone is not enough under the statute, which expressly requires some degree of control or use. The inadvertent entry into a vehicle mistaken for one's own would not constitute this crime — something more is needed since the statute contains a knowledge component. Whether denominated as exercising control over or otherwise using a vehicle, we conclude that a violation of the statute occurs when a person enters an automobile without permission and takes actions that interfere with or are detrimental to the owner's possession or use of the vehicle."
Judge Smith, in a concurring opinion, would have retained what he saw as the rule from the court's prior cases: "unauthorized occupation without consent." He takes the majority to task for its new rule requiring "interference." He posits several hypotheticals: "Does an intruder manifest 'control or use' if he talks to a friend while sitting in the car? Smokes a cigarette? Looks out the window for the time it would take to smoke a cigarette? The only example the majority gives of something that would not be prohibited is 'inadvertent entry into a vehicle mistaken for one's own,' but an entry without mens rea is excluded on the face of the statute, which applies only to someone who acts '[k]nowing that he does not have the consent of the owner.'"
Judge Jones, joined by Judge Pigott, dissented. The dissent would have adopted the following rule: "'unauthorized use' convictions may only be sustained where the defendant's presence in a stationary vehicle is coupled with other evidence demonstrating the ability to operate the vehicle or the means to do so. Based on the foregoing, I would hold that for the purpose of legal sufficiency, in order for a lone defendant to come within the unauthorized use of a vehicle statute, evidence must be adduced at trial that he or she, without the authorization of the vehicle owner (and with an intent to operate the vehicle), obtained the means to set the vehicle's mechanism in operation or possessed tools designed to bypass the vehicle's ignition system." (LC)
New case on Rape Shield Law
In People v. Scott (Ct. App. 5/3/2011) (Jones, J.) (7-0), three 8th grade girls went to a party and then to another house, where they drank, smoked marijuana, and engaged in sexual activity. One of them alleged that a male minor (Steven A.) and the Defendant, a 23-year-old male, had sex with her, the latter against her will. The trial court agreed with the People that evidence of sexual contact with Steven A. was inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law unless the People introduced evidence about the victim's bruising. In addition, the Defendant was prohibited from elicitng from another witness that the victim stated that she was crying because she had sex with Steven A.
The Court of Appeals ducked the question of whether the witness' statement was admissible notwithstanding the Rape Shield Law, since it was relevant to a defense and in the interests of justice to do so. The court declined to address the issue because the Defendant was acquitted of Rape 1º—forcible rape. Instead, he was convicted of Rape 2º—statutory rape, which does not require evidence of force or lack of consent.
So let's continue where the court left off. What if the Defendant had been convicted of forcible rape? One could argue that the evidence of the other sexual encounter should have been admitted since it would have gone to rebut the implication that she was crying because she had been forcibly raped. On the other hand, the question is not just whether the evidence was relevant to a defense but also whether it is in the interests of justice to admit it. Here, the court must take into account the strong policy reasons behind the Rape Shield Law. In addition, the People were permitted to introduce the victim's statement to one of the other girls that she did not want to have sex with Defendant. She made the statement while exiting the bedroom where she was alone with the Defendant. She came out crying and wearing only a bed sheet. The helpfulness of the second statement, purporting to explain her crying as a result of her encounter with Steven A., is ultimately undercut by the first, where she is crying and speaking about the incident with the Defendant. Ultimately, in balancing the various interests, the court could have concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the evidence. (LC)
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