In People v. Carncross (Ct. App. 3/25/2010) (Lippman, C.J.) (5-2), the defendant was on felony probation and barred from operating a motor vehicle. Regardless, the defendant decided to drive a motorcycle on the country roads of New York State. A state trooper observed the defendant speeding and pursued him with emergency lights ablaze. Seeing the trooper in hot pursuit, the defendant "'took off' in an attempt to 'not get[] caught by the trooper.'" During the ensuing chase, the trooper lost control of his SUV and crashed head-on into a tree. He died immediately. The defendant returned home and made damaging statements about the chase to his father and girlfriend. Several days later, the defendant turned himself in to the police and gave an inculpatory statement after consulting with his attorney. The People elected to present the defendant's case to a grand jury and called the defendant's father and girlfriend to testify. One of the defendant's retained attorneys, Mary Gasparini, represented the father and girlfriend at the time of their testimony. The Grand Jury indicted the defendant on one count each of Reckless Driving, Aggravated Manslaughter 2º, and Aggravated Criminally Negligent Homicide.
Subsequently, the People moved to disqualify Gasparini and her partner on conflict of interest grounds. The People noted that Gasparini represented the girlfriend and father at the Grand Jury. Further, the People noted that, if the girlfriend and father were called as witnesses at trial, Gasparini may have to cross-examine both the girlfriend and father. This scenario, the People argued, would create a conflict of interest between Gasparini's duty to zealously advocate for the defendant and her duty to protect the confidentiality of the girlfriend and the father. The trial court appointed an independent attorney to advise the defendant regarding the conflict of interest. After meeting with the defendant twice and reducing the legal advice to a letter to the defendant, the independent counsel "informed the court that defendant understood the conflict and was willing to waive it[.]" The defendant then waived the conflict in open court. However, the trial court granted the People's motion, ruling that Gasparini "must be disqualified in order to protect the defendant's right to effective assistance of trial counsel[.]" At trial, the People called neither the defendant's father nor the defendant's girlfriend to testify. Subsequently, a jury acquitted the defendant of the Aggravated Man 2º charge but convicted him of the Reckless Driving and Aggravated CNH charges.
On appeal, the defendant's primary argument was that he denied his right to be defended by counsel of his own choosing. The argument, in the view of the court, highlighted the dilemma of a trial court "faced with a defendant willing to waive a conflict[,]" because a court's' decision may be challenged regardless of the outcome. In its analysis, the court noted that trial courts "must balance [a] defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel" against the defendant's right to choose his own counsel. The latter right affords the defendant some ability to waive certain conflicts of interest. Additionally, the court noted that trial courts presumptively favor a defendant's choice of counsel. However, the court also cautioned that the right was "not absolute and [a] court may decline to honor the defendant's waiver of a conflict[.]" Balancing these considerations, the court concluded that the greatest consideration was the trial court's "independent obligation to ensure that defendant's right to effective representation was not impaired." Additionally, the court observed that the trial court must have broad discretion to consider potential conflicts of interest, since they do not have "the benefit of hindsight[.]" Applying these precepts to the facts, the court held that the trial court "did not abuse its broad discretion."
The dissent argued that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the defendant's choice of counsel. While conceding that a potential conflict of interest existed, the dissent labeled that conflict "theoretical at best because the witnesses [we]re united with the defendant[.]" (JTR/LC)
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