In People v. Riddick, federal and local law enforcement officers in a van observed defendant with two other individuals at a street corner known for "violent gang activity." The driver of the officers' van pulled up to the defendant, rolled down his window, and told the defendant to leave the area. The defendant then "reached for his waistband and walked away from his companions[,]" before fleeing. The officers pursued the defendant and recovered a discarded handgun during a subsequent search of the defendant's path. The motion court refused to suppress the recovered handgun and defendant's statements made after the pursuit. The defendant pleaded guilty and subsequently appealed.
In its analysis, the majority considered the relevant De Bour stages of police encounters. Regarding the initial relevant De Bour stage, the majority held "that the police had an objective credible reason to approach [the defendant] and to request information in light of the late hour, the cold weather, the absence of other . . . traffic, and the presence of the men in a high crime area."
Regarding the second relevant De Bour stage, the majority first considered that, while the defendant's flight alone was insufficient to justify pursuit, flight in combination with "other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity" may give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion for the police to give lawful pursuit. The majority held that the defendant's reaching for his waistband and subsequently fleeing from police did not "establish the requisite reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime." In so holding, the majority noted "'that actions that are 'at all times innocuous and readily susceptible of an innocent interpretation . . . may not generate a founded suspicion of criminality'" (quoting People v. Powell, 246 A.D.2d 366, 369 (1st Dept. 1998)). Using this rule, the majority reasoned that "absent any indication of a weapon such as the visible outline of a gun or the audible click of the magazine of a weapon, does not establish the requisite reasonable suspicion[.]"
The majority also supported its holding by concluding that "the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was insufficient to establish that defendant knew that the individuals who approached him in the unmarked vehicles were police officers." Preliminarily, the court considered and concluded that the defendant preserved the argument of the sufficiency of evidence at the suppression hearing. In considering the record of the suppression hearing, the majority seemed to draw an adverse inference from the absence of testimony from the driver of the officers' van, since the driver "was in the best position to testify concerning the visibility of the police markings on his clothing[.]" Additionally, the majority discounted as "mere speculation" the testimony of a passenger in the van asserting that the defendant knew the persons in the van were police officers.
Because the majority concluded that the handgun and defendant's subsequent statements to officers should have been suppressed, the court vacated the defendant's guilty plea and ordered the indictment to be dismissed.
The dissenters disagreed with the majority in regard to the preservation issue, noting that the defendant presented a different theory to support his sufficiency argument on appeal. In regard to the merits of the defendant's contentions, the dissent argued that "reasonable inferences to be drawn from [the officers'] testimony support the conclusion that defendant was aware that [the individuals inside the van] were police officers." Additionally, using a totality of the circumstances analysis, the dissent argued that the defendant's reaching for his waistband before fleeing created reasonable suspicion. (JTR/LC)
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